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Abstract 
 
This paper revisits the issue of business social responsibility with a view to reiterate its 
relevance in the contemporary scenario characterised by an overarching presence of 
private businesses and blurring of the barriers  between not-for-profit and for-profit 
enterprises.  The paper reviews the evolution of major theoretical positions of business 
social responsibility to demonstrate how the basic understanding of the term traversed 
through time and alongside changes in forms of business organisation and interpretations 
of the morality of private property.  It draws on stakeholding and social contract theories 
to underscore the moral and social responsibility of businesses to broaden their vision 
beyond profit and stakeholder value.  
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Binding stakeholders into moral communities:  
A review of studies on social responsibility of business 
 
 
 
What are businesses for? How do businesses relate to society?  Do businesses have to 
consider and oblige stakeholders other than their owners or shareholders?  In the 
contested terrain of business ethics and business social responsibility these questions 
have been asked and answered umpteen number of times.  The answers have varied 
depending upon one’s political and moral preferences regarding what businesses 
represent and reproduce.  Thus, those who view businesses as upholding the institution of 
private property, the backbone of the capitalist economic order, which, by its very 
dynamics reproduces economic growth and wellbeing, responsibility is coterminous with 
shareholder wealth maximisation. Here, the implicit policy direction is to promote the 
wealth-seeking ambition of owners and investors in an unconstrained fashion so that 
general economic and social well being can be automatically taken care of.  Within this 
position a concern like social responsibility is a redundant issue.  There is a counterview 
that the legitimacy of business rests on its service to the society and not on its ability to 
generate profit for its owners.  Thus, society as represented by a host of distinct 
constituencies, is the predominant stakeholder of any business which makes societal 
obligation the raison d'être of its functioning.  A more rational position, however, seems 
to lie somewhere in between – business neither exists for serving the unbridled self 
aggrandisement of ambitious and greedy investors nor for furthering some altruistic 
motives to the complete neglect of the economic calculus of the owners and investors.   
 
In this paper we attempt to revisit the issue of business social responsibility with a view 
to reiterate its significant relevance in the contemporary scenario, mainly for two reasons.  
First, increasingly, private business has come to occupy the centre stage in the growth 
strategies across countries, including the ones that used to follow statist development 
policies in the earlier decades.  Unique ways are evolved by many economies to engage 
private business even in spheres that have hitherto been dominated by the bureaucracy 
(for instance, basic services).  Second, the concept of business responsibility has become 
more complex as the not-for-profit organisations, driven by the compulsion to achieve 
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economic sustainability, have started organising some of their activities on for-profit 
mode. Addressing such initiatives from the point of view of business responsibility may, 
prima facie, look inconsequential as the very rationale for their incorporation is located in 
their social change mission.  However, it is important to recognise that profit-
maximisation objective demands amends in the overall culture and behavioural patterns 
of even not-for-profit entities, which, in turn, may produce outcomes that do not 
necessarily increase overall societal wellbeing or serve the entity’s original, altruistic goal 
of social transformation.  
 
The paper is divided the following way.  Section 1 reviews the evolution of the major 
theoretical approaches and concepts relating to business social responsibility.  We will 
discuss here the theoretical debates around social responsibility and attempt to trace the 
evolution of the central concepts.  In Sections 2 and 3, we will elaborate the theories of 
stakeholding and the social contract theory respectively with a view to expound the core 
question of who should businesses be responsible to and how they can potentially bind 
the salient stakeholders into moral communities.  While stressing the need for businesses 
to enlarge their vision beyond profit maximisation to address the interests and claims of 
non-shareholding stakeholders, we will also review the relevant analytical schemes that 
can provide useful insights to the management in deciding on stakeholder salience.     
 
Section 1 
 
Socially Responsible Business: Meanings and Interpretations  
 
There is a considerable body of work that seeks to develop and apply theoretical 
frameworks to the question of the role of business in society. They help disentangle 
issues that are central to business ethics and social responsibility.  This field of study is 
also a contested one as there exist competing and mutually exclusive visions about the 
nature and purpose of corporations (Dunfee, 1999).  Two distinct ethical approaches are 
found to have influenced these visions – the positive or the descriptive approach and the 
normative approach. Under positive ethical approaches are included empirical enquiries 
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into the ethical attitudes and behaviours of various actors in the business space.  The 
normative approaches set out to prescribe, by delving deep into the basic questions of 
right and wrong, what ‘ought to be’ done by businesses for them to be called socially 
responsible.  There are multiple perspectives even among theories that are prescriptive in 
nature.  At one end of the spectrum are theories that position business social 
responsibility within the larger principles of egalitarian social development, while at the 
other end are those that uphold the utilitarian view that the business of business is to 
make profits.  
 
Social responsibility broadly can be defined as the ethical orientation of an entity – be it a 
person, a body corporate or a government – to contribute to the egalitarian development 
of the society of which it is part.  As Bobo (1991) argues social responsibility is an aspect 
of egalitarianism. He further defines social responsibility as a cluster of beliefs that 
acknowledges the existence and consequences of social and economic inequality and an 
obligation to contributing towards its mitigation.  The egalitarian view, according to 
Bobo, is not the opposite of individualism; they are “concurrent ideological commitments  
that may assume different levels of importance across individuals” (pp.74-75). This 
definition of social responsibility, when applied to the realm of business would mean 
responsiveness of business entities to societal issues which motivate them to go beyond 
their economic, technical and legal obligations.1   
 
The concerns about the ethical orientation of businesses and their sense of social 
responsibility have evolved through the past seven to eight decades interacting with 
varying forms of business organisations and different ethical and legal interpretations as 
to their rights and duties.  Merrick Dodd of the Harvard Law School was one of the 
earliest scholars to have discussed the issues of trust and fiduciary responsibility that bind 
managers and owners and its consequences for social well being.  Writing in the early 
1930s, in a world reeling under the effect of the Great Depression, Dodd (1932) stated: 
Business -which is economic organization of society – is private property only in a 
qualified sense, and society may properly demand that it be carried on in such a way as to 
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safeguard the interests of those who deal with it either as employees or consumers even if 
the proprietary rights of its owners are thereby curtailed (p.1162, emphasis added).2  
 
In Dodd one sees the germination of the debate that later attracted significant degree of 
intensity and rigour – do businesses have a ‘fiduciary type obligation’ to their 
‘stakeholders’? This question has been addressed in the later years by several scholars 
and their interpretations largely reflected the dominant mode of business of their times. 
Even Dodd’s concerns were shaped by the business environment prevalent in his times 
wherein many of the enterprises were owned by absentee investors who took little or no 
interest in their running and management, while the sole function of the corporate 
managers was thought to be of helping the stockholders obtain maximum amount of 
profits.  He envisioned a future where the law will “regard all business as affected with a 
public interest” (p.1149). He also imagined the dawn of a new spirit that would drive 
businesses “to become a profession of public service not primarily because law had made 
it such but because a public opinion shared in by businessmen themselves has brought 
about a professional attitude” (p.1153).  In the early 1950s, the writings of Frank Abrams 
(1951) and Howard R. Bowen (1953) were critical in legitimising ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ (CSR) as a distinct field of study.  According to Abrams, businessmen, 
like all other professonals have “a duty to conduct the affairs of the enterprise to maintain 
an equitable and workable balance among the claims of the various directly interested  
groups, a harmonious balance among stockholders, employees, customers and the public 
at large”.3 In his book titled Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (1953), Bowen 
referred to the responsibility of businessmen to pursue those policies, decisions and 
actions that are desirable in terms of the social objectives and values.4 CSR became a hot 
topic of discussion during the decade that ensued – “a deadly serious occupation”, to 
quote Levitt (1958) - among intellectuals, business leaders and political elite alike.  
 
The harshest critique of the reformers’ preoccupation with social responsibility in the 
1950s can be seen in the essay published in 1958 by Theodore Levitt, The Dangers of 
Social Responsibility, where he argued that “the function of business is to produce 
sustained high level profits” (Levitt, 1958: 44).  He apprehended that if corporations 
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buckled under the pressure of reformers to commit themselves to the ‘new orthodoxy’ of 
doing social good they will eventually assume a monolithic influence which is 
completely against the spirit of capitalism that can thrive only in pluralistic societies with 
political democracy and personal freedom. In such societies there is a separation of 
everyday functions in the realms of economical, political, social and spiritual.  “In the 
end”, he wrote, “business has only two responsibilities – to obey the elementary canons 
of everyday face to face civility (honesty, good health, and so on) and to seek material 
gain” (p. 49).  
 
The primacy of the shareholder was the basic building block of the utilitarian ethics and 
is most vociferously represented by Milton Friedman. In his essay, The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits published in 1970 Friedman opposed 
any form of moral responsibility of business entities towards society. Regarding the role 
of corporate executives he stated that in a free-enterprise, private-property system, a 
corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business, an agent serving the 
interests of his principal. His direct responsibility is to his employers and that responsi-
bility is “to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be 
to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, 
both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom”.  Private competitive 
enterprise has great virtue in that ‘it forces people to be responsible for their own actions’ 
and makes it difficult for them to "exploit" other people for either selfish or unselfish 
purposes. They can do good - but only at their own expense.  This position indeed reflects 
some of the classical political economy notions about business social responsibility.  In 
an engaging essay titled, Smith vs Marx on Business Morality and the Social Interest 
William J. Baumol (1986) says that Adam Smith had a strong distrust for businessmen 
and their commitment to social responsibility.  Social good cannot be achieved by 
depending on anybody’s good intentions. The market mechanism governed by the 
doctrine of self interest is the best way to make human beings work in the service of 
general welfare.    
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For Friedman, corporate establishments as opposed to the public and political state are 
private apolitical actors. The doctrine of social responsibility, according to him, involves 
the acceptance of the socialist view that political mechanisms, not market mechanisms, 
are the appropriate way to determine the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses.  
In his book Capitalism and Freedom published in 1962 Friedman had called corporate 
social responsibility a ‘fundamentally subversive doctrine’ in a free society. He argued: 
There is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of 
the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or 
fraud (Friedman, 1970).  He contests the view that corporations have to submit their 
decisions to public scrutiny. They do not need to so long as they are governed by the 
legal and moral framework of the state. Private actions are legitimised by the results they 
create and the self interested market transactions of the corporate establishments do 
contribute to social wellbeing.5  According to Friedman social responsibility is one way 
for a corporation to generate goodwill ‘as a by-product of expenditures that are entirely 
justified on its own self-interest’. He urged corporate executives to refrain from this 
‘hypocritical window-dressing’ because it harms the foundation of a free society. 
 
Expectedly, discussion on business ethics and social responsibility is irrelevant in the 
Marxist scheme of thought, the ideological opposite of the liberal free market thinking. 
Baumol (1986) argues that Marx being a historical materialist was not concerned with the 
personal morality of the capitalist. For him, capitalist is the product of historical process.  
“…the capitalist did evil deeds not because he was born or raised to be a moral cripple 
but because the natural circumstances left him no choice” (p.4).  Also, as Shaw (2009) 
points out, excessive focus on the morality of individual units thwarts attention from the 
systemic vices of capitalism. What is relevant is critique and eventual overthrow of 
capitalism and its replacement with a totally different and better socio-economic order.  
 
Even within positions that strongly endorse the need for corporates to be responsible, 
there exist distinctly different logical streams. One line of thinking is informed by the 
economic theory of the firm and values social responsibility for the economic returns that 
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it may yield.  Thus, the virtue of social responsibility is that it increases the long term 
value of the firm or improves its economic performance. It has an instrumental value in 
that it enhances the legitimacy of the firm among the stakeholders to develop a positive 
image (Morimoto, Ash and Hope, 2004) and serves as a success factor.  Hence, the social 
responsibility objectives of business firms are invariably shaped by the expected 
economic results of business firms (Laczniak and Murphy, 1993).   
 
The prescriptive conceptions of social responsibility, as we discussed earlier, are 
concerned with what corporates ought to do and what they ought not.  They emphasise on 
the ethical sensitivity of management and seek to examine, justify and improve the moral 
quality of business behaviour even when there are no pressures from external power 
groups.  Businesses must follow ethical behaviour and governance of organisations 
(respecting basic human rights, reducing environmental pollution/ degradation, reducing 
gender gap, promoting decent work standards).   Exclusive focus on shareholder value is 
looked is both ‘morally wrong and socially damaging’. 
 
As noted earlier, the question seeking normative justification for the existence of business 
evolved through the years in consonance with the changes that came about in the very 
form and nature of business.  At the time when Dodd wrote, many of the enterprises were 
owned by absentee investors who were indifferent to the way business was conducted; 
their singular interest was dividend.  For Dodd it was hardly thinkable to imbue these 
stockholders with a spirit of public service.  Three decades and two World Wars later, the 
business scenario was markedly different in the developed part of the world.  In the face 
of declining demand, shrinking margins, rising competition and increasing concentration 
of ownership in the hands of financial institutions (through the mediation of capital 
markets), managerial performance came under close scrutiny in the 1980s and 1990s. 
There was widespread restructuring of business enterprises in the US and Europe with a 
view to enhance returns to investment. As Owen observed, by that time, managerial 
capitalism had given way to investment capitalism.6  Shareholder interests came to 
assume primacy in corporate economics, which has not only changed the rules of the 
game in the conduct of business, but has also brought newer ethical concerns to the fore.   
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The Discursive Approach to Social Responsibility  
 
It is evident that the dominant interpretations of business social responsibility are all 
positioned within the realm of the economic. While the virtues of a liberal democracy are 
celebrated as most necessary for the successful functioning of business, the major 
functions of society are assumed to be mutually exclusive.  The operational sphere of 
business is understood as completely apolitical and asocial. Or, as Sherer and Palazzo 
(2008) argue, the political framework of rules and regulations is taken as efficient and 
well functioning.  The contemporary phase of capitalist development, however, has 
negated many of these conventional notions as the boundaries of the exclusive fields of 
human activity have been blurred or their sphere of influence changed or eroded.  For 
instance, globalisation has meant expansion of businesses trans borders and beyond the 
regulatory scope of individual nations (Ibid).  The current phase of capitalist expansion 
also has given rise to new actors, institutions and forms of governance that defy a 
monotonic interpretation of the role of business in society.  
 
A broader idea of business social responsibility that addresses some of the complex 
interrelationships between business, society and polity is presented in Sherer and Palazzo 
(2007 and 2008). They base their idea on Jurgen Habermas’ conception of ‘deliberative 
democracy’, rooted strongly in the belief in the primacy of democracy to philosophy. Its 
advantage over the utopian approaches to business social responsibility is that it 
accommodates both ethical discourse and economic bargaining as it views economic 
rationality as being circumscribed by democratic institutions and procedures.  With 
businesses and markets going global, there is a definite need to ‘domesticate economic 
pressures by democratic control’ and to find new actors who can assume the 
responsibility of governance along with the traditional nation state.  Firms can assume 
this political role as and when necessary by ‘authoring rules with public impact’.  The 
discursive approach that Sherer and Palazzo propose suggests the criticality of discourse - 
the process of deliberation and argumentation – among the stakeholders in order to 
critique and justify social claims and interests, and forming ethical strategies.  The 
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legitimacy and credibility of business action is enhanced in a discursive model as it is 
open to public scrutiny and debate.  
 
Social Responsibility and Social Performance 
 
Does commitment to be responsible to society result in desirable outcomes to the 
business entity? How do businesses translate their noble intentions to functional 
processes? What guidelines do they use to address and manage social issues?  The 
concept of corporate social performance (CSP) is seen as the integrative approach to look 
at these questions by exploring the underlying interaction among three dimensions - 
principles (CSR responsibilities - philosophical orientation), processes (Corporate social 
responsiveness - institutional orientation) and policies (Social Issues Management – 
organizational orientation) (Wartick and Cochran 1985).   
 
Wood (1991) tried to advance Wartick and Cochran’s definition thus: “a business 
organization's configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social 
responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the 
firm's societal relationships” (p.693).  Wood argues that in CSP one needs to examine:  
1. the degree to which principles of social responsibility motivate actions taken on 
behalf of the company (assumes that principles motivate actions); 
2. the degree to which the firm makes use of socially responsive processes (specific 
responsive processes are environmental assessment, stakeholder management and 
issue management); and  
3. the existence and nature of policies and programs designed to manage the firm's 
societal relationships, and the social impacts (i.e., observable outcomes) of the 
firm's actions, programs, and policies. 
Also, principles, processes, and outcomes are to be examined “in conjunction with each 
other to permit identification of analytically crucial but politically difficult results such as 
good outcomes from bad motives, bad outcomes from good motives, good motives but 
poor translation via processes, good process use but bad motives...”(p.693).   
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Though CSP has been put forward as solution to the problem of an analytical 
disconnection between social responsibility and social responsiveness, its ability to do so 
has been questioned by scholars.  The critics point out that CSP models are the best 
illustrations of the utilitarian view of management. As Sherer and Palazzo (2007) 
maintain, “Their implicit goal is to produce technical knowledge about how organisations 
work and how their survival in a competitive environment can be achieved” (p.8).  By 
their very logic, SP models accept the status quo without striving to criticize or justify the 
norms that govern corporate strategies and thus may promote ‘morality of the mighty’.  
 
Section 2  
 
Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Discourse 
 
The central question is who should businesses be responsible to? As Jones (1980) asks, if 
corporations have an obligation to groups in society other than stockholders or owners 
and beyond that prescribed by law or union contract, “What are these groups? How many 
of these groups must be served? Which of their interests are most important? How can 
their interests be balanced? How much corporate money should be allotted to serve these 
interests?” (pp. 59-60). As we have seen earlier, the justifications for endorsing social 
responsibility orientation of business straddle extremes.  Positions as boundless as 
addressing social justice and equity render the desired field of action for businesses so 
wide that the fundamental purpose of business existence stands diluted.  Too focused and 
narrow interpretations like that of shareholder primacy create an illusion of a very limited 
sphere of influence of businesses.   
 
Western stakeholder theorists have made significant contribution towards unpacking – if 
not completely resolving - the above dilemma by helping in the identification of certain 
classes of entities as stakeholders.7  However, they differ considerably on the issue of 
taking a broad or narrow view of a firm’s stakeholder universe.  A rather broad definition 
of stakeholder was provided by Edward Freeman, according to whom stakeholder is “any 
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s 
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objectives”.8 While tracing the history of the term, Freeman argues that the concept was 
originally defined as ‘those groups without whose support the organisation would cease 
to exist’.  Such groups could include shareholders, consumers, users, neighbours, 
governments, suppliers, creditors, and distributors.9  Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) 
proffered a more pragmatic explanation of who a stakeholder is: one who has an 
‘obligation-generating stake’ in an organization’s decision that results from the 
possibility of getting affected by that decision or from a potential risk. The concepts of 
stake (including non-financial stake) and risk help one focus sharply on those entities 
with legitimate claims, irrespective of their power to influence the firm.   The theories of 
stakeholding emphasise the complexity of transactions that involve multitude of factors.   
 
The theoretical positions that assume a pluralistic view – the view that emphasizes 
broader constituencies of corporations - are in conflict with the monotonic view that 
’shareholders claim the corporation’s heart’.10  For those who believe in the primacy of 
shareholders, focus on extra-shareholder interests reflects “inappropriate social and 
political considerations” (Dunfee, 1999: 130).  These considerations are incompatible 
with the substantive business objective as they undermine private property and the 
possibility of maximizing values to particular groups as also reject the objective of long 
term owner value (Sternberg, 1999).  Also, by implying accountability to multiple 
masters the pluralistic theories complicate the functioning of corporate governance 
system.   
 
An issue of central concern to the social responsibility debate is whether organizations 
pursue the satisfaction of stakeholder interests for economic reasons or simply because 
doing so has intrinsic merit. As Donaldson and Preston (1995) would put it, the former 
reflects an ‘instrumental approach’ (‘certain outcomes are more likely if firms/managers 
behave in certain ways’) to stakeholder management and the latter, a normative approach 
(‘firms/managers ought to behave in certain ways’). Obviously, business entities that 
behave as opportunists do not acknowledge the intrinsic reason for being socially 
responsible. An unfortunate fall out of this may be that powerless stakeholders are 
shunted aside to make way for the ‘morality of the mighty’ (Freeman and Gilbert, 1988).   
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Deciding Stakeholder Salience:  A Managerial Challenge  
  
Given the diversity in the stakeholder universe, how do managers achieve a fair balance 
between the needs and concerns of these diverse stakeholders?  Is there a way to identify 
salient and legitimate stakeholders? An interesting attempt to answer these questions 
came from Mitchell, Agle and Wood in the form of a conceptual scheme to classify 
stakeholder on the basis certain crucial attributes. They presented an exhaustive list of 
stakeholder classes while trying to model stakeholder identification and salience, like 
owners and non owners of the firm; owners of capital or owners of less tangible assets; 
actors or those acted upon; those existing in a voluntary or an involuntary relationship 
with the firm; rights-holders, contractors, or moral claimants; resource providers to or 
dependents of the firm; risk-takers or influencers; and legal principals to whom agent-
managers bear a fiduciary duty. According to the scheme, there are three attributes by 
which classes of stakeholders can be identified. The attributes are: i) power (to influence 
the firm decisions); ii) legitimacy (of relationship with the firm); and (iii) urgency (of 
claims on the firm).  The authors argued that based on the possession, or the attributed 
possession, of one, two, or all three of the attributes the various classes of stakeholders 
might be identified.  
  
Seven stakeholder types emerged from the various combinations of the attributes - three 
possessing only one attribute, three possessing two attributes, and one possessing all three 
attributes.  These are classified under three broad categories – dormant, expectant and 
definitive (Exhibit 1).  In Exhibit 1 we have tried to depict the typology. 
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Exhibit 1:  Stakeholder types by attributes  
Class Type  Attribute  Ability to demand attention 
Dormant Power  No or little interaction 
Discretionary Legitimacy  Managers are not encouraged to interact 
La
te
nt
 S
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
Demanding Urgency  Irksome, but do not warrant attention of 
management  
Dominant Power and 
Legitimacy 
Expect and receive attention, but not the 
full attention of managements  
Dependent  Urgency 
and 
Legitimacy 
Support of other stakeholders or 
guidance by internal management’s 
value needed 
Ex
pe
ct
an
t S
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
Dangerous Urgency 
and Power 
Potential risks to stakeholder-manager 
relationship; to individuals and entities 
involved 
D
ef
in
iti
ve
 S
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
Definitive Power, 
Legitimacy 
and 
Urgency   
Managers have clear and immediate 
mandate to attend to their claims; 
expectant stakeholder can move to 
become definitive stakeholder; common 
occurrence is movement from dominant 
stakeholder to definitive stakeholder 
category 
Source: Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997). 
 
 The classification can help firms identify the entities that should be considered 
stakeholders from which managers can select the ones that they perceive as salient. 
Entities with none of the three attributes in relation to the firm cannot be seen as 
stakeholders and, hence, the management cannot ascribe any salience to them. The major 
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limitation of the model is that the identification of stakeholders depends decisively on 
managerial perception.   
  
Identifying salient stakeholders is the first step towards the complex process of building 
ethical business strategies by incorporating their concerns and priorities.  Social contract 
theory offers a valuable framework to conceptualise and operationalise a deliberative 
process for strategisation.  We will elaborate this in the following section.   
 
Section 3 
 
Social Contract: A Framework to Create Moral Communities of Stakeholders  
 
The theory of social contract originated in Europe and evolved through the 17th and 18th 
centuries as part of the intellectual pursuit of political theorists like Thomas Hobbes, John 
Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau to find a philosophy that legitimizes the role of 
government and the authority of the state.  For Hobbes the social contract helps men 
avoid the undesirable consequences of the State of Nature like distrust and destruction.  
According to him, social contract is a set of laws by which all agree to abide and an 
enforcement mechanism for these laws. For John Locke, who imagined the State of 
Nature as having certain inconveniences, but not as harsh or cruel, social contract is a set 
of mutually satisfactory rules that serves as a mechanism for assuring the welfare of 
individuals (Snyder et.al., 2006). He maintained that citizens’ cooperation and consent to 
legal authority is the basis for their adherence to law.  The social contract that he 
propounded is an expression of the reciprocal obligations of citizens and state (Dunfee, 
Smith and Ross, 1999). Enforcement did not figure in his theory as he believed that 
reason and not coercion is at the base of social cooperation.  
 
A strong advocate of the values of liberty, equality and fraternity, Rousseau’s idea of 
social contract involves people recognizing a collective 'general will' that represents the 
common good or public interest to which all citizens should be committed irrespective of 
what their personal interests are.  Rousseau has elaborated the term social contract thus: 
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“Each one of us places in common his person and all his powers under the supreme 
direction of the general will; and we receive back as a corporate body, each member, as 
an indivisible part of the whole” (Singh, 2006: p.13).  According to this 
conceptualization, ‘a people is a group who have made a contract of a special kind that 
has both changed their natures and individual personalities and created out of their 
isolated natural selves, a collective agency capable of both embodying and legislating 
over their individual wills’.  Rousseau insisted that the social contract is not a permanent 
phenomenon.  It needs continuous reaffirmation by the citizens.  
 
Social contract theory has been applied to business by scholars like Thomas Donaldson 
and Thomas Dunfee. The social contracts, according to Donaldson and Dunfee, are 
informal, implicit, but critical agreements that exist within industries, national economies, 
trade groups and corporations and that bind these into moral communities (Donaldson 
and Dunfee, 1999).   Donaldson, considered a pioneer in this respect, argues that the 
modern social contract grants protection to corporations in return for being efficient 
producers of goods and services and not for abusing those who provide them with these 
rights including customers and employees.  He questions the conventional wisdom that 
‘shareholder wealth maximization is the great good for business’ (Fort and Noone, 1999).  
Corporate legitimacy, according to Donaldson, is established only through the 
cooperation and commitment of society articulated through an agreement between the 
two.  “If General Motors holds society responsible for providing the condition of its 
existence, then for what does society hold General Motors Responsible? What are the 
terms of the social contract?”.11  Social contract theory is thus used by Donaldson to 
ascertain that the business corporations have a moral foundation.  While resolving 
business dilemmas, productive organisations are bound to follow minimum standards of 
justice like avoidance of fraud and deception, respect for workers as human beings, 
avoidance of any practice that systematically worsens the situation of a given group in 
society.   
 
Dunfee, on his part, emphasizes upon the extant social contracts while arguing that the 
actual legal contracts enacted by specific communities serve as the basis for moral rules.  
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He argues that “The shareholder primacy norm, if fully incorporated into the legal 
regime, would still require that stakeholder interests be considered when doing so has a 
foreseeable impact upon shareholder wealth” (Dunfee, 2000: p.135).  The corporate 
constituency statutes enacted by many of the American states since the early 1980s are 
seen as having limited impact on the stakeholder constituency as they do not have a 
mandate to consider stakeholder interests.   Dunfee contests this view and maintains that 
“corporate law allows management to act in furtherance to many types of interests other 
than pure short-term shareholder wealth maximization” (ibid: p. 136-7).   
  
Combining the empirical studies of business behaviour and the normative evaluation of it 
Donaldson and Dunfee proposed a new social contract theory - the Integrated Social 
Contract Theory (ISCT) - in the early 1990s.  This theory is based on the idea that the 
rules of behaviour within communities are founded on social norms.  In this model 
community is defined as a “self-defined, self circumscribed group of people who interact 
in the context of shared tasks, values, or goals and who are capable of establishing norms 
of ethical behaviour for themselves” (p.262).  The ISCT encompasses two types of social 
contracts: (i) a normative, hypothetical macrosocial contract used as a heuristic device; 
and (ii) multitude of actual microsocial contracts found in various living communities 
(Dunfee, Smith and Ross, 1999). The ISCT strives to define social contract as an 
agreement that ‘overcomes bounded moral rationality’ and provides a moral framework 
for economic activity while reflecting the diverse personal precepts of the contractors 
(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994 and 2000).  Bounded moral rationality, an extension of 
concept to bounded economic rationality, posits that moral agents are constrained in 
terms of “information, time, and emotional strength to make perfect judgements 
consistent with their moral preferences” (Dunfee, Smith and Ross, 1999: p.18).  The 
limitations of bounded morality and the particularities of personal circumstances can be 
circumvent through a macrosocial contract.  
 
The terms of the macrosocial contract put forward by Donaldson and Dunfee can be 
elaborated thus: 
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• Local economic communities have ‘moral free space’ in which they may generate 
ethical norms for their members through microsocial contracts.  
The term ‘moral free space’ is used to denote the right of the local communities to 
define the critical aspects of their morality.  It reflects the enormous variety in 
cultural, religious and moral preferences among individuals and communities and 
provides an ethical justification for diversity.   
 
• Norm generating microsocial contracts must be grounded in consent, buttressed 
by the rights of individual members to exercise voice and exit.12 
 This clause suggests that there are limits to moral relativism as implied by the term 
‘moral free space’.   While communities have differing norms within the moral free 
space they may generate ‘authentic norms’ or the norms to which members have 
consented in a real and informed way (Fort and Noone, 1999).  The consent, however, 
also means that the community respects the right of its members to exit and raise 
voice.  In sum, a norm supported by the attitudes and behaviours of a substantial 
majority of community members who recognise the right to voice and exit becomes 
an authentic norm.  
 
• In order to become obligatory or legitimate, a macrosocial contract norm must be 
compatible with hyper norms.  
Hypernorms are the universal principles that limit the moral free space and bound the 
authentic norms.  They are fundamental principles that are used to judge the 
community generated norms. Three types of hypernorms are identified by Donaldson 
and Dunfee: structural, procedural and substantive.  Structural hypernorms are 
principles that establish and support essential background institutions in society (e.g., 
to honour institutions that promote justice and economic welfare).  Conditions that 
support consent in macrosocial contracts are called procedural hypernorms (e.g., 
rights to voice and exit). Substantive social norms consist of fundamental concepts of 
the right and the good (promise keeping, respect for humanity).   
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A social contract among all the salient stakeholders of the organisation plays a very 
strategic role in the day to day running of the firm as also in achieving its long term 
goals.  It is relevant here to reiterate Sacconi’s (2004) elaboration on the need for social 
contract.  Firstly, it serves as a touch stone to review and assess the outcomes of the day 
to day functioning of the organisation. Secondly, a typical social contract ensures 
avoidance of force, fraud and manipulation. Thirdly, it allows each party to negotiate on 
the basis of its capacity to contribute and its assessment of the utility of each agreement/ 
non agreement.  Fourthly, it makes sure that each stakeholder derives from the social 
contract at least the reimbursement of the cost of specific investment that it makes 
towards surplus generation. The overarching significance of trust must be emphasised in 
evolving and operationalsing social contract, which can serve as an instrument to regulate 
surplus distribution and, given the rigidities in information flow, act as a tool to match  
organisational commitments and stakeholder expectations.  
 
In the process that leads to the structuring and formulation of social contract, it is not 
enough that the stakeholders are consulted.  A multistage deliberative process is required 
to generate impartially acceptable agreements. It must be ensured that stakeholders with 
different power and resources participate in a discourse that is inclusive, democratic and 
free of power asymmetries.14 What is to be emphasised is that the ethical validity of the 
final agreement depends as much on the process as on the outcome.   
 
Conclusion  
 
In this paper we have revisited the issue of business social responsibility with a view to 
reiterate its significant relevance in the contemporary scenario characterised by an 
overarching presence of private businesses and blurring of the conventional barriers  
between not-for-profit and for-profit enterprises.  We have reviewed the evolution of 
major theoretical positions and ideological interpretations of business social 
responsibility to demonstrate how the basic understanding of the term traversed through 
time and alongside changes in forms of business organisation and interpretations of the 
underlying morality of private property. Thus one encounters extreme ideological 
 21
positions – ‘subverting freedom’ to ‘subserving greed’- with respect to social 
responsibility of businesses. We have specifically drawn on the theoretical streams 
relating to stakeholding and social contract to underscore the moral and social 
responsibility of businesses to broaden their vision beyond maximising profit and 
stakeholder value to address the interests and claims of non-shareholding stakeholders.  
 
We argued that focussing exclusively on shareholder value may bring about morally 
wrong and socially damaging consequences. Most importantly, the dynamic and 
discursive nature of business-society interrelationship warrants an ongoing discourse – a 
process of deliberation and argumentation - among the multiple stakeholders who hold 
salience to the business entity to critique and justify the claims and interests of different 
moral communities. Social contract provides a meaningful mechanism to facilitate such a 
discourse by binding the salient stakeholders into moral communities.  Moreover, a 
discursive model of business social responsibility enhances the legitimacy and credibility 
of business action as it is open to public scrutiny and debate.  
 22
REFERENCES 
 
Baumol, William J., 1976. Smith vs. Marx on Business Morality and the Social Interest. 
American Economist, 20 (2), Fall, 1-6. 
Bobo, Lawrence, 1991. Social Responsibility, Individualism and Redistributive Policies. 
Sociological Forum, 6 (1), 71-92. 
Dantwala, M.L., 1985. Trusteeship: Its Value Implications. Gandhi Marg, November-
December, 504-08.  
Dodd, Merrick E., Jr., 1932. For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?. Harvard Law 
Review, XLV (7), 1145-1163. 
Donaldson, Thomas, & Lee E. Preston, 1995. The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications. Academy of Management 
Review, 20 (1), 65-91.  
Donaldson, Thomas, & Thomas W. Dunfee, 1994. Toward a Unified Conception of 
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory. The Academy of 
Management Review, 19 (2), 252-84. 
Donaldson, Thomas, & Thomas W. Dunfee, 2000. Ties that Bind: a Social Contracts 
Approach to Business Ethics, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Dunfee, Thomas W., 1999. Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality. Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 62 (3), Summer,129-157. 
Dunfee, Thomas W., N. Craig Smith, & William T. Ross, Jr., 1999. Social Contracts and 
Marketing Ethics. The Journal of Marketing, 63 (3) July, 14-32.  
 23
Fort, Timothy L., & James J. Noone, 1999.  Banded Contracts, Mediating Institutions, 
and Corporate Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of Contractual Theories of The 
Firm. Law and Contemporary Problems 62 (3), Summer: 163-213.  
Frederick, William Crittender, 2006. Corporation, Be Good! The Story of Corporate 
Social Responsibility, Indianapolis: Dog Ear Publishing. 
Freeman, R. Edward, & D.R. Gilbert, 1988.  Corporate Strategy and the Search for 
Ethics, New Jersey: Prentice- Hall.  
Freeman, R. Edward, & John McVea, 2001. A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic 
Management. Working Paper No. 01-02. University of Virginia. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=263511.
Friedman, Milton, 1970. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. 
The New York Times Magazine. September 13. Retrieved from 
http://www.ethicsinbusiness.net/
 Henderson, David, 2001. Misguided Virtue: False Notions of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, The Institute of Economic Affairs, London.  
Jones, Thomas M., 1980. Corporate Social Responsibility Revisited, Redefined. 
California Management Review, 22 (3), 59–67. 
Laczniak, Gene R., & Patrick E  Murphy, 1993. Ethical Marketing Decisions: The 
Higher Road. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon.  
Levitt, Theodore, 1958. The Dangers of Social Responsibility. Harvard Business Review, 
September-October.  
 24
Mitchell, Ronald K., Bradley R. Agle, & Dona J. Wood, 1997. Toward a Theory of 
Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principles of Who and What 
Really Counts. The Academy of Management Review, 22 (4), October, 853-86. 
Morimoto, R., J. Ash, & C. Hope, 2004. Corporate Social Responsibility Audit: From 
Theory to Practice. WP 14, Research Papers in Management Studies. The Judge 
Institute of Management, University of Cambridge. 
Reynolds, MaryAnn, & Kristi Yuthas, 2008. Moral Discourse and Corporate Social 
Responsibility Reporting. Journal of Business Ethics, 78, pp. 47-64. 
Sacconi, Lorenzo, 2004. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a Model of 
“Extended” Corporate Governance:  An Explanation Based on The Economic 
Theories of Social Contract, Reputation and Reciprocal Conformism. Liuc Papers 
n. 142, Serie Etica, Diritto ed Economia 10, suppl. a febbraio. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=514522. 
Sethi, J. D., 1985. Trusteeship and the Crisis in Economic Theory. Gandhi Marg 
November-December, 540-59. 
Shaw, William H., 2009.  Marxism, Business Ethics, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics 84, 565–576. 
Sherer, Andreas Georg, & Guido Palazzo, 2007. Toward a Political Conception of 
Corporate Responsibility: Business and Society Seen from a Habermasian 
Perspective. The Academy of Management Review, 32 (4), 1096-1120.   
Sherer, Andreas Georg, & Guido Palazzo, 2008. Globalization and Corporate Social 
Responsibility. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J.Moon and D.Siegel 
 25
(Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (413-31). New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Singh, N.K. (ed.)., 2006. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract of Principles of 
Political Right. New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House.  
Snyder, Johnny, Don Carpenter, & Gayla Jo Slauson, 2006. MySpace.com: A Social 
Networking Site and Social Contract Theory. Proc ISECON 2006, 23. Retrieved 
from http://proc.isecon.org/2006/3333/ISECON.2006.Snyder.pdf.  
Sternberg, Elaine, 1999. The Stakeholder Concept: a Mistaken Doctrine. Issue Paper 
No.4, London, Foundation for Business Responsibilities, November.   
Wartick, Steven L., & Philip L. Cochran, 1985. The Evolution of the Corporate Social 
Performance Model. The Academy of Management Review, 10 (4), October, 758-
69.  
 
 
 26
 
FOOTNOTES 
 
1.     McWilliams and Siegel (2001) define social responsibility of corporates as “actions 
that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is 
required by law”. In other words, social responsibility equires corporates to go beyond 
abiding by what the law prescribes. They elaborate this pointing out that when a company 
“avoids discriminating against women and minorities, it is not engaging in a socially 
responsible act; it is merely abiding by the law” (p.117). 
2.     Coincidentally, almost around the same time, at the other end of the world, deeply 
entrenched within the freedom movement of India, M.K. Gandhi was trying to give shape 
to his idea of ‘trusteeship’. But he had a rather wider view of the social role of the 
‘owners of wealth’.  His concept of ‘trusteeship’ “provides a means of transforming the 
capitalist order into an egalitarian one” by giving the owning class a chance to ‘reform’.  
It does not recognise any right of private ownership of property except so far as it may be 
permitted by society for its own welfare.  Under the economic order that underlies the 
working of this concept, the character of production will be determined by social 
necessity and not by personal whim or greed (Dantwala, 1985).  Trusteeship is 
interpreted as a theory of need-based production, equitable distribution and social justice 
(Sethi, 1985).  
3.     Quoted in Frederick (2006), p.7. 
4.     Howard R. Bowen, quoted in Wartick and Cochran (1985). 
5.     Milton Friedman and Fabienne Peter as discussed in Sherer and Palazzo (2007). 
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6.     Sir Geoffrey Owen, in his forward to Henderson’s monograph on CSR (2001).   
7.     Having originated in the mid 1980s with the publication of Edward Freeman’s work, 
The Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, stakeholder theory has evolved into 
an integral part of strategic management.  For an interesting discussion on the evolution 
of stakeholder theories, see, Freeman and Mc Vea (2001). 
8.     Quoted in Sternberg, 1999: p.46.   
9.     Some of the broad definitions of stakeholders are provided by Alkhafaji (“groups to 
whom the corporation is responsible”) and Thompson Wartick and Smith (groups “in 
relationship with an organisation”). See, Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) for details.   
10.    Gordon Smith, as quoted in Dunfee (1999). 
11.    Donaldson (1982), quoted in Dunfee, Smith and Ross (1999): p.17.  
12.    Dunfee, Smith and Ross (1999) use the term ‘protected informed consent’ to denote 
this. 
13.    To borrow the terminology of Reynolds and Yuthas (2008). 
 
